Many security sensors and other protection mechanisms are deployed at different levels to provide what is known as defensein-depth for systems and networks. However, the large volume of security alerts experienced makes it challenging for operators to analyze the attack situation and take an appropriate response. Based on network configurations there are two major challenges to display and analyze potentially very-large and complex graphs of multi-step cyber attacks against networks. One is to transform large quantities of network security data into real-time actionable intelligence. The other is to visualize the complex graphs, including all possible network attack paths, while still keeping complexity manageable.
Figure 1. Analysis and visualization model for large complex multistep cyber attack graphs.
ture better than other space-filling techniques. It also provides varying degrees of support for interactive operations such that one can first obtain high-level overviews quickly, and then drill down to specific details.
The attack analysis module includes correlating isolated alert sets, attack plan recognition, and attack prediction. We apply Bayesian-network-based 17 mechanisms to reason and correlate attack steps based on security states of systems and networks. These incorporate prior knowledge of attack transition patterns and handle uncertainty in the correlation process. Since cyber attackers exploit vulnerabilities in unexpected ways in order to incrementally penetrate the network and compromise critical systems, the probability-based reasoning method manages risks and significantly reduces the impact of attacks by knowing the
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Once an attack is correlated, the attack notification service retrieves the correlated alerts that comprise the attack scenario and uses it to instantiate an attack node, binding formal parameters to arguments. The attack node is then shipped to the RSF hierarchy visualization system where it can be analyzed and, potentially, placed within a highlighted attack hierarchy to capture its role in a multi-stage or coordinated attack. The visualization and analytical functions implement and render vulnerability assessment and attack predication so that a real-time attack notification is possible. Since the proposed hierarchy visualization system is interactive, users can easily manipulate the view to accommodate their interests when then wish to focus their attention on particular objects. Analytical functions within the attack notification service provide several capabilities vulnerability assessment, hierarchy construction, and attack prediction.
As shown in Figure 1 , we utilize dynamic game-theory for graph-based attack awareness and response analysis since the integration of attack graphs and alert correlation graphs provide 'perfect' knowledge about the attacker's strategy space. Gametheoretic analysis computes (Nash) equilibriums out of any mathematical game. 18 In terms of which types of dynamic games are most suitable for graph-based multi-step attack response, our initial studies show two things. First, if the attacker can clearly recognize each defense action and wants to see the effects of the current defense action against his latest attack action before choosing a new action, a dynamic observe-then-act game can be used to compute the optimal defense strategies. Second, if the attacker has substantial uncertainty in recognizing a defense action but is good at identifying an attack state, multistage dynamic games with simultaneous moves can be used. Further research will be conducted to investigate dynamic games in detail for attack analysis. 
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